individual member, will fall prey to its enemies. With::ıut consultation in the alliance, it would be very difficult to overcome internal rivaIries, lessen tensions and maintain the collective security of the members. Certainly NATO is a partnership of sovereign states and there will be different approaches and reactions in order to cop e with internal and external difficulties. However, it is through consultation that options compatible with both sovereignity and partnership can be found, and formulated into policy acdons.
Large states are often accused of acting on international issues without consulting their smaIler allies. Although there might be many instances lending credence to this daim, this do es not mean that consultation is not looked upon as a desirable course of action by even the superpowers. In 1967 the then vice-president of the U.S., Mr. Hubert H. Humphrey expressed to the Allies the "Golden Rule of Consultation": " ... and if we foIlow the golden rulethat each of us consult as soon, as ofter, and as frankly as he would wish the others to consult-the alliance will prove to be the midwife of more hopeful times." 2 OperationaIly speaking, what categories öf interaction between nember states are to be termed political consultation? Opinions of scholars and other writers vary. For example, Harlan Cleveland uses the following categorization :3 1. Exchange of information (notification af ter the fact). This can take various forms e.g. report of NATO ministers' visits to Eastern Eloc countries. Intellig:::mce reports on what has aIready happenEd.
2. Analysis. Here various briefings and discussions among experts are included. For example, while the war in Vietnam was going on, the United States gaye regular briefings on the progress of the conflict. In addition, na-tional expert assessments on threats to peace are regularly shared among the allies.
3. Consultation about national actions. This consists of notification as a matter of general interest. For example, U.S. base negotiations affecting U.S. forces in Europe, and exchange of views on U.N. annual agenda items fall into this category.
4.
Consent building notification (after the fact). The primary example of this is the advance word President Kennedy sent about pending U.S. action in the Cuban Missle Crisis. AIso, explanation of the American intervention falls into this category.
5. Advance consultation on national actions. Examples of this category are the U.S.-U.S.S.R. SALT negotiations, Belgian disarmament talks, with Poland, discussion on visits of national leaders to the Soviet Union.
6. Consultation (befare and during) with a view to parallel national actions and attitudes. Non-proliferation treaty, periodic Berlin crises, stoppage of contacts with the Warsaw pact members are examples.
7. COI15ultation (before and during) with a view to colective action. Report On the Future Tasks of the Alliance (1967) , Guidelines for the use of tactical nuelear weapons, appointment of NATO commanders, constitute this sart of consultation.
One of the actual participants in many acts of consultatian was the Halian diplomat Manlio Brosio. Having served as Secretary -Generalaf NATO from 1964 to 1971, he was in an excellent position to observe the process of consultation first hand. In an artiele written almost ten years ag0 4 he complained that because a given area falls outside of the geographical boundaries of the Alliance; member nations sametimes tend be reluctant to discuss possible national polities. This reluctance has been lagely remedied in recent years. The Allies have consulted on the MBFR A more recent study is that of Roger HilL.
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His book is one of the most definitive works on political consultation. Here we find a detailed survey of the issues upon which political consultation took place up to the mid 1970's.This book also contains an excellent and thorough deseription of the actual practice and techniques of consultation in
NATO.
Another book-lenght treatment of the subject of consultation was done by Maria Rita Saulle. 6 Professor Saulle reiterates the procedures and suggestions stated in the Three Wise Men's Report and the Harmel Comission Report. She then goes on to examine the various issues which required NATO consultation.
In recent years we have observed an increase in tension and an obvious strain in the relations between the Allies. it would be worth while to focus our attention on a number of issues which create tension in the Alliance and see how consultation can help to reduce these tensions. We will try to accomplis this, first by enumerating the causes of the tension and then by dwelling upon the issues on which the allies see less than eye to eye.
We would like to state at the outset that, although the differences between Europe and American (the two poles of different opinions on various matters) are very real and they have to be dealt with, theyare not fatal and "death has not as yet come to the Arch-alliance".7 Be that as it may, what are the basic reasons for this trouble? it seems convenient to look at this from two perspectives : i. First of all there are the psychological reasons. Following World War II, the relations between a developed and untouched by war, America and a devastated and "saved" Europe were one s of codiality and gratitude. What happened to the smaIl nations of the Baltic region and Eastem Europe was a grim reminder to the countries of Western Europet that if they were to remain free, they had to band together and accept the leadership of the United States. Under Stalin's role the Soviets annexed or otherwise controlled an area amounting to approximately 18000 square miles and over 23000000 population. This expansion took only a few years and had started before the war ended. In addition, by 1948, through pressures and aid to local commurust paties, Budapest, Bucharest, Warsaw, Sofia, and Prague all had govemments sympathetic to the Soviet Union.
it was obvious that Soviet ambitions would not stop at the borders of the Westem European countries. This is why there was an urgent need for the war-torn, dem ocratic nations of Westem Europe to join their resources to fend off any possible agression. What followed af ter this decision was made, Le. the events leading to the formal establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are well known and need not be recounted here.
During the post-war years massive American military and economic aid poured into Europe. But this godsent gift also brought with it the seeds of envy. Here was a relatively new country, known in Europe for its innovations in technology, but also for its brash and awkward ways in matters diplomatic, which was shaping the defence planning and economic destiny of the old and mature Europe. This created a complex in the European mind which emerges in different forms even taday. For example, one authorı suggests that, although formally NATO is a partnership of equals, the presence of over 300000 American soldiers in Europe creates a sense of dominatian that the Americans could only understand if 300000 European As time went by, European perceptions of the Soviet Union changed. Differences began to emerge between the Americans and the Europeans about how to manage the Soviets. A younger generatian has emerged which changed the old adage, and began to chant "better red than dead". For this group, the Soviet Union was not quite the agressiYe giant it was made to be. The benefits of detente partly gave eredence to the claims of the "peace mavement" adherents.
As detente became an every day wJrd, bendit, of detente began to become not quite the same thing rJ1' Europe and the United States. While detente, of ecurs::: Icssened the tensions between the two super-powers, Americans viewed detente as indivisible. In other words, the Soviet Union could not be permitted to tae the lii18 in Europe, but feel free to cerate mischief in other parts of the world. For the Europeans d8tente could be divjsible. The relaxation of tensions in Europe, and the creation of a military equilibr,ium (both conventional and nucleaı-l that the European countries could live with constituted a suffieient benefit for the Europeans.
In a way this is understanda.ble. Areport prepared for the U.S. Senate calls the most basic cause of the differences between the two sides of the Atlantic the "we are here and theyare there" syndrome.
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Here the underlying American assumption is that, since the Europeans are so close to th3 Soviet UnIon, they should be very concemed with their safety and thus hold a hard-line attitude. In fact, just the reverse is true. Because of proximity, Europeans know that they wil! be the major sufferers in the event of a war. Thal'efore, they do not wish to become victims of war univittingly. When President Reagan said that he "could see where you could have the exchange of tactical weapons against troops in the field without it bringing either one of the major powers to pushing the button",IO the Europeans were aghast with horror, since the "field" mentioned in the statement was in fact their homelands.
Ideology is another intangible cause of rift between the two sides. In America, Marxism is seen as the culmination of all the negative things imaginable. In Europe, on the other hand, while the majority of the people do not wish to liye under a Marxist government, this ideology is often a souce of inspiration for social programs or welfare policies. American idealagical inconsistencies, political scandals a la Watergate, and on1aga.in-off-aga.in references to human rights as an end in foreign policy actions, all contribute to doubs about whether American "ideology" is what it was once thought to be.
Lastly i would like to mention the element of st yle as one major psychological cause of malaise in the alliance.
The problem of st yle is a function of how Amerjcan actions are perceived by the European allies. Here, the issue of prior consultation comes up most urgently. Especially during .President Ca!'ter's tenure, the Europeans ccmplained of the "zig-zags" in American poHcy. For example, during the Ford-Carter T.V. debates, President Carter championed a reduction in defense spendings, and vet toward the end of his Presidency a complete about-faee had been executed and Americans were again spending money on conventional weapons. President Johnson was riot known for his subtlety or elegance in diplomacv. His notorious letter of 1964, written to the prime-minister of Turkey, asking that eountry not to intervene in Cyprus, has a.ffected the relations between the U.S. and Turkey for almost tw') decades.
II. As fOl-the issues because of which divergence occurs, the first thing that com es to mind is what NATO is supposed to do for out-of-area theats. Here, of course, the most immediate concern is for the Persian Gulf regjon Secondly there is the Indian Ocean security area. In the LO Ibid., p. 10.
Persian Gulf, the U.S. oil imports amount to 10 per cent of the total imorts for that country. The Europeans are mu ch more heavily dependent on oil supply from this part of the world. The general European attitude is to look upon the US-USSR struggle here as one of super power struggle and to not be too bold in pledging support. However, if worse were to happen and the gulf oil was to be cut off on account of Soviet actions, the unified Alliance reaction would be to alleviate the problem by all means necessary. In short, the Europeaİıs do not want to be put in a position of pulling the chestnuts out of the fire for the U.S. As far as we can best determine the main thrust of the European approach here is to provide maximum economic and military support to the countries involved, but to maintain a low profile presence.
The Siberian pipeline issue also caused an uproar of protest within the Alliance when pesident Reagan decided to impose an export ban on all the U.S. manufactured components of the gas pipeline, on October 30, 1981. Six months later, when the ban was extended to include the European subsidiaries of the U.S. componies, the European governments such as Germany and Britain flatly refused to comply. This issue was resolved on November 13, 1982 when the President lifted all restraints. The Americans were known to be rather like-warm about the pipeline anyway. As they saw it, Europe would become dependent on Soviet gas and therefore, could fall under Soviet manipulation. There are convincing counter arguments too. For instance, a number of RAND Corporation studies show that alternative resouces can be marshalled in case of need, and that since the Soviets would need the hard currency earnings from the natural gas sales, they would be inclined to think twiC8 before they attemp a cut-off.
11 By 1990 25 % of the German natural gas would come from the Soviet Union, this would constitute 114 of the 16.7 per cent that natural gas occupies in the general energy supply for Germany. For Italy, 32 % and 35.2 % of the gas supply would be coming from the Soviet Union. In these two countries gas represenb 17.2 % (France) and 18.5 % Cltaly) of the total energy balance. The total earnings of the Soviet Union by Iate 1980's would be about seven billion dollars, which very likely will go into the coffers of the U.S., since grain purchases of the Soviet Union from the United States will amount to approximately this much money.12
One other issue of great controversy within the Alliance has been the matter of the deployment of intermediate rarıge nucl€ar forces, INF for short. Several years ago, in 1979, Henry Kissinger gave a spech on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversay of the establishment of NATO, He expressed the need for INF thus "If there is no theater nuclear establishment on the contİnent of Europe, we are writing the script for selective blackmail in which our allies will be threatened, and in which we will be forced into a decision whereby we can respond only with a strategy that has no military purpose but only the aim of destruction of populations."13
The five countries where intermediate nuclear forces would be employed (Germany, England, Belgium, The Netherlands and Halyı have mixed reactions on this matter. While theyall have agreed to the deployment in principle, Belgium, The Netherlands, England and Germany have vociferous pacifist opposition. All of the European countries would like to see the Americans display a certain ampunt of flexibility at the START negotiations in Geneva. If, for €xample, a zero-zero plan, that is, the dismantling of the Soviet SS-20's, SS-4's and SS-5's, in return for not deplaying INF weapons, were to be accepted by the parties concerned, all of the European allies would breathe easier.
On other fronts, namely, burden sharing for the east of maintaining the American forces in Europe, equipment and weapon standardization and economic rivalry between Europe and the United States, there are significant differences to be settled.
Our primary interest is political consuItation, one feels certain that the various formal and informal discussion and consuItation forums will be used to bring together divergent ponts of view. However, since NATO is a conglomeration of independent, sovereign, democratic states, a certain amount of difference in national policies is inevi. table. even desirable. Foreign policy decisions in democratic societies are results of a Iaborious process of consensus building. Domestic political concerns and sensitivities of the vating public has to be taken into account. In a paper recently delivered,ı3 Gegory Treverton suggests that in the relations with the Eastem bloc, there might be an implicit division of labor, where the Unite States takes the hardline against the Soviet Union, and the Europeans reflect a hint of flexibility. Increasingly, however, this is taken in the American Cogress and other foci of public opinion, as America doing the dirty work while the Europeans "have their Cake, and eat it too". if this feeling reaches serious proportions, and becomes wide spread, the very existence of the AIIiance wiIl be jeopadised.
I will close this report by borrowing from the Report of the Committea of Three on Non-military Cooperation; "Effective and constructive international cooperation requires a resalve to work together for the solution of comman problems. There are special ties between NATO members, special incentives and security interests, which should make this task easier than it otherwise would be. But its successful accompilshment wiIl depend largeIyon the extent to which member governments, in their own policies and actions, take into consideration the interests of the aIIiance. This requires not only the acceptance of 14 G,egory F. Treverton, "Is there a 'Crisis' in U.S. -European Relations?", Paper delivered at the conference on "The Successor Generatian and the Atluntic AlIiance", RAND Corp., Santa Monica, Calif., February 14-17, 1983. p. 21.
